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| | MEMORANDUM FOR: | Deputy Director of Security (PTOS) | |
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| | | CIA Hember, APEX Industrial Security Manual Task Force | |
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| | attention the cu Manual being dev Security Committee | rpose of this memorandum is to bring to your urrent status of the APEX Industrial Security veloped by the Community Security Group, DCI tee, and to highlight serious concerns the respect to the Manual. | 2 |
| 25X1 | the aftermath of studies were con Program. One by of the Industrial prepare a series collateral as we activities within ate the lack of and procedures exphysical securit materials, whether ate approximate pertaining to do | way of background, you will recall that in f the Boyce/Lee espionage case, several nducted of the Agency's Industrial Security y-product of those reviews was the formation al Security Branch which was directed to s of industrial security manuals governing ell as compartmented classified contracting in industry. These manuals were to: eliming uniformity, loose and imprecise standards existing in the current manuals; improve the ty standards for the protection of classified her collateral or compartmented; and incorpolely 20 additional general security requirements ocument control, tighter personnel supervision, ity enhancements as directed by the DCI and Security. | |
| 25X1 | Security Procedum specifically des Books" currently collateral class painstakingly pr | ponse to the above direction, "Standard ures for Contractors" (SSPC) was developed and signed to supersede the "White and Green y in use by the Office of Logistics for sified contracting activities. The SSPC was repared, widely coordinated within the Agency of SAFSS) and subsequently approved. | • |
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 CIA-RDP85T00788R000100060012-5

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It is now being readied for publication and dissemination. Particular care was taken to incorporate into the SSPC precise and clear-cut security procedures, improved security standards for the protection of classified material - higher in most respects than those currently in force for the protection of compartmented materials - and to introduce those general security requirements of particular concern to the DCI and the Director of Security.

Once the SSPC was approved, the next step was to develop a similar manual governing compartmented information and which would be as uniform as possible with the SSPC which dealt exclusively with the collateral world. It was anticipated that the compartmented manual, once approved within the Agency, would be coordinated within the Community for eventual application Community-wide. As it turned out, however, the responsibility to prepare the compartmented version was . diverted from the Industrial Security Branch and assigned to the Community Security Group, DCI Security Committee, under the latter's charge to prepare authoritative guidelines for the protection of compartmented information within Government and industry. The so-called APEX System is to be a single control system designed to replace the three current control systems under which sensitive compartmented information is currently being protected. [

5. A draft APEX Industrial Security Manual was recently circulated within the Agency for review and comment. Conspicuous among reviewer responses was that the manual lacked specificity, was vague, and absent the 20 or so security requirements mandated by the DCI and the Director of Security. Further, it was noted that the manual lacked procedural detail, could not stand alone and would beg the issuance of a host of implementing directives - probably in conflict with one another - from a multitude of Government agencies engaged in compartmented contractual activities. This would make procedural uniformity incredibly difficult if not 25X1 impossible.

6. As is apparent, the concerns expressed about the APEX draft transcend syntax and grammar. The core of the problem is the general and imprecise nature of the APEX Industrial Security Manual and that the absence of specificity will produce a lack of uniformity. In other words, if approved the APEX Industrial Security Manual essentially will bring us back to where we started.

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7. If the current draft of the APEX Industrial Security Manual is approved as written — as appears to be the case — then the Agency may want to consider preparing its own manual governing SCI, modeling it after the SSPC. Uniformity would then be achieved at least within the Agency Industrial Security arena. Such a course of action would seem permissible in view of the following provisions set forth in the APEX draft:

"This Manual is not...intended to intrude on the authority of Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO's) of the Intelligence Community who will continue to prescribe basic direction, classification guidance and policy on dissemination for programs under their cognizance... To fulfill their responsibilities, Government officials may provide additional implementing guidance to contractors under their cognizance as necessary as long as such guidance is coordinated with the DCI Security Committee."

| It is noted discussed : Working Gr | in genera | al terms | with the | Chairman | . APEX | option Manual | was |
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